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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes Ramsey-optimal monetary policy in a medium-scale macroeconomic model
that has been estimated to fit well postwar U.S.\ business cycles. We find that mild deflation is
Ramsey optimal in the long run. However, the optimal inflation rate appears to be highly sensitive
to the assumed degree of price stickiness. Within the window of available estimates of price
stickiness (between 2 and 5 quarters) the optimal rate of inflation ranges from -4.2 percent per year
(close to the Friedman rule) to -0.4 percent per year (close to price stability).  This sensitivity
disappears when one assumes that lump-sum taxes are unavailable and fiscal instruments take the
form of distortionary income taxes. In this case, mild deflation emerges as a robust Ramsey
prediction.  In light of the finding that the Ramsey-optimal inflation rate is negative, it is puzzling
that most inflation-targeting countries pursue positive inflation goals. We show that the zero bound
on the nominal interest rate, which is often cited as a rationale for setting positive inflation targets,
is of no quantitative relevance in the present model. Finally, the paper characterizes  operational
interest-rate feedback rules that best implement Ramsey-optimal stabilization policy. We find that
the optimal interest-rate rule is active in price and wage inflation, mute in output growth, and
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11 Introduction
Two fundamental but separate questions in the theory of monetary stabilization policy are
what is the optimal monetary policy and how can the central bank implement it. Both
questions have been extensively studied in the existing related literature, but always in the
context of simple theoretical structures, which by design are limitedin their ability to account
for actual observed business-cycle ﬂuctuations. The goal of this paper is to characterize
optimal monetary policy and its implementation using a medium-scale, empirically plausible
model of the U.S. business cycle.
The model we consider is the one developed in Altig et al. (2005). This model has been
estimated econometrically and shown to account fairly well for business-cycle ﬂuctuations
in the postwar United States. The theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of
combining nominal as well as real rigidities in explaining the propagation of macroeconomic
shocks. Speciﬁcally, the model features four nominal frictions, sticky prices, sticky wages,
a transactional demand for money by households, and a cash-in-advance constraint on the
wage bill of ﬁrms, and four sources of real rigidities, investment adjustment costs, vari-
able capacity utilization, habit formation, and imperfect competition in product and factor
markets. Aggregate ﬂuctuations are driven by three shocks: a permanent neutral technol-
ogy shock, a permanent investment-speciﬁc technology shock, and temporary variations in
government spending. Altig et al. (2005) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
argue that the model economy for which we seek to design optimal monetary policy can
indeed explain the observed responses of inﬂation, real wages, nominal interest rates, money
growth, output, investment, consumption, labor productivity, and real proﬁts to neutral and
investment-speciﬁc productivity shocks and monetary shocks in the postwar United States.
In our characterization of optimal monetary policy, we depart from the widespread prac-
tice in the neo-Keynesian literature on optimal monetary policy of limiting attention to
models in which the nonstochastic steady state is undistorted. Most often, this approach
involves assuming the existence of a battery of subsidies to production and employment
aimed at eliminating the long-run distortions originating from monopolistic competition in
factor and product markets. The eﬃciency of the deterministic steady-state allocation is
assumed for purely computational reasons. For it allows the use of ﬁrst-order approximation
techniques to evaluate welfare accurately up to second order (see Rotemberg and Woodford,
1997). This practice has two potential shortcomings. First, the instruments necessary to
bring about an undistorted steady state (e.g., labor and output subsidies ﬁnanced by lump-
sum taxation) are empirically uncompelling. Second, it is ex ante not clear whether a policy
that is optimal for an economy with an eﬃcient steady state will also be so for an economy
2where the instruments necessary to engineer the nondistorted steady state are unavailable.
For these reasons, we refrain from making the eﬃcient-steady-state assumption and instead
work with a model whose steady state is distorted.
Departing from a model whose steady state is Pareto eﬃcient has a number of impor-
tant ramiﬁcations. One is that to obtain a second-order accurate measure of welfare it no
longer suﬃces to approximate the equilibrium of the model up to ﬁrst order. We solve the
equilibrium of the model up to second order using the methodology and computer code de-
veloped in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004c) for second-order accurate approximations to
policy functions of dynamic, stochastic models. One advantage of this numerical strategy is
that because it is based on perturbation arguments, it is particularly well suited to handle
economies with a large number of state variables like the one studied in this paper.
We address the ﬁrst question posed above, namely, what business-cycle ﬂuctuations
should look like under optimal monetary policy by characterizing the Ramsey equilibrium
associated with our model. The central policy problem faced by the monetary authority is,
on the one hand, the need to stabilize prices so as to minimize price dispersion stemming
from nominal rigidities and, on the other hand, the need to minimize and stabilize the op-
portunity cost of holding money to avoid transactional frictions. The task of characterizing
Ramsey-optimal policy is challenging because the model is large and highly distorted. A
methodological contribution of the research project to which this paper belongs is the devel-
opment of computational procedures to derive and characterize the Ramsey equilibrium for
a general class of dynamic rational expectations models.1
We ﬁnd that the policy tradeoﬀ faced by the Ramsey planner is resolved in favor of
price stability. In eﬀect, the Ramsey optimal inﬂation rate is -0.4 percent per annum, with
a standard deviation of only 0.1 percentage points. The optimality of near-zero inﬂation,
however, is highly sensitive to the assumed degree of price stickiness. Available estimates of
the degree of price stickiness vary between 2 and 5 quarters. Within this range, the optimal
rate of inﬂation increases from a deﬂation of about 4 percent per year when prices are
reoptimized every two quarters to a mild deﬂation of less than half a percent when prices are
reoptimized every ﬁve quarters. So, depending on what available estimate of price rigidity
one chooses to pick, the Ramsey-optimal policy can range from close to the Friedman rule,
to close to price stability.
Quite independently of the precise degree of price stickiness, the optimal inﬂation target
is below zero. In light of this robust result, it is puzzling that all countries that self-classify
as inﬂation targeters set inﬂation targets that are positive. In eﬀect, in the developed world
1Matlab code to replicate the quantitative results reported in this paper is available on the authors’
websites.
3inﬂation targets range between 2 and 4 percent per year. Somewhat higher targets are ob-
served across developing countries. An argument often raised in defense of positive inﬂation
targets is that negative inﬂation targets imply nominal interest rates that are dangerously
close to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and hence may impair the central
bank’s ability to conduct stabilization policy. We ﬁnd, however, that this argument is of
no relevance in the context of the medium-scale estimated model within which we conduct
policy evaluation. The reason is that under the optimal policy regime, the mean of the
nominal interest rate is about 4.5 percent per year with a standard deviation of only 0.4
percent. This means that for the zero lower bound to pose an obstacle to monetary policy,
the economy must suﬀer from an adverse shock that forces the interest rate to be more than
10 standard deviations below target. The likelihood of such an event is practically nil.
We address the question of implementation of optimal monetary policy by characterizing
optimal, simple, and implementable interest-rate feedback rules. We restrict attention to
what we call operational interest rate rules. By an operational interest-rate rule we mean
an interest-rate rule that satisﬁes three requirements. First, it prescribes that the nominal
interest rate is set as a function of a few readily observable macroeconomic variables. In the
tradition of Taylor (1993), we focus on rules whereby the nominal interest rate depends on
measures of inﬂation, aggregate activity, and possibly its own lag. Second, the operational
rule must induce an equilibrium satisfying the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
And third, operational rules must render the rational expectations equilibrium unique. This
last restriction closes the door to expectations driven aggregate ﬂuctuations.
Our numerical ﬁndings suggest that in the model economy we study, the optimal opera-
tional interest-rate rule responds aggressively to deviations of price and wage inﬂation from
target. The price-inﬂation coeﬃcient is about 5 and the wage-inﬂation coeﬃcient is about 2.
In addition, the optimal interest-rate rule prescribes a mute response to deviations of output
growth from target. In this sense, the implementation of optimal policy calls for following
a regime of inﬂation targeting. The parameters of the optimized rule are robust to using a
conditional or unconditional measure of welfare.
Remarkably, the optimal operational interest-rate rule delivers a welfare level that is
virtually identical to the one obtained under the Ramsey-optimal policy. Speciﬁcally, the
welfare cost associated with living in an economy where the monetary authority follows the
optimal operational rule as opposed to living in the Ramsey economy is only 0.23 dollars per
year per person (or 0.001 percent of 2006 annual per capita consumption).
The remainder of the paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Section 2 presents the theoreti-
cal economy and derives nonlinear recursive representations for the price and wage Phillips
curves as well as for the state variables summarizing the degree of wage and price disper-
4sion. Section 3 describes the calibration of the model and discusses the solution method.
Section 4 characterizes the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. Section 5 studies the dy-
namics induced by the Ramsey monetary policy. Section 6 computes the optimal operational
interest-rate rule. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The skeleton of the model economy that we use for policy evaluation is a standard neoclassical
growth model driven by neutral and investment-speciﬁc productivity shocks and government
spending shocks. In addition the economy features four sources of nominal frictions and ﬁve
real rigidities. The nominal frictions include price and wage stickiness ` a la Calvo (1983) and
Yun (1996) with indexation to past inﬂation, and money demands by households and ﬁrms.
The real rigidities originate from internal habit formation in consumption, monopolistic
competition in factor and product markets, investment adjustment costs, and variable costs
of adjusting capacity utilization.
To perform monetary policy evaluation, we are forced to approximate the equilibrium
conditions of the economy to an order higher than linear. To this end, we derive the exact
nonlinear recursive representation of the complete set of equilibrium conditions. Of par-
ticular interest is the recursive nonlinear representation of the equilibrium Phillips curves
for prices and wages. These representations depart from most of the existing literature,
which restricts attention to linear approximations to these functions. Another byproduct
of deriving the exact nonlinear set of equilibrium conditions is the emergence of two state
variables measuring the degree of price and wage dispersion in the economy induced by the
sluggishness in the adjustment of nominal product and factor prices. We present a recursive
representation of these state variables and track their dynamic behavior.
2.1 Households
The economy is assumed to be populated by a large representative family with a continuum
of members. Consumption and hours worked are identical across family members. The
household’s preferences are deﬁned over per capita consumption, ct, and per capita labor





tU(ct − bct−1,h t), (1)
5where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able at time t, β ∈ (0,1) represents a subjective discount factor, and U is a period utility
index assumed to be strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument, strictly decreasing in its second
argument, and strictly concave. Preferences display internal habit formation, measured by
the parameter b ∈ [0,1). The consumption good is assumed to be a composite made of a








where the parameter η>1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across diﬀer-
ent varieties of consumption goods.
For any given level of consumption of the composite good, purchases of each individual
variety of goods i ∈ [0,1] in period t must solve the dual problem of minimizing total
expenditure,
R 1
0 Pitcitdi, subject to the aggregation constraint (2), where Pit denotes the


















This price index has the property that the minimum cost of a bundle of intermediate goods
yielding ct units of the composite good is given by Ptct.
Labor decisions are made by a central authority within the household, a union, which
supplies labor monopolistically to a continuum of labor markets of measure 1 indexed by










t denotes the nominal wage charged by the union in labor market j at time t, Wt is
an index of nominal wages prevailing in the economy, and hd
t is a measure of aggregate labor
demand by ﬁrms. We postpone a formal derivation of this labor demand function until we
consider the ﬁrm’s problem. In each particular labor market, the union takes Wt and hd
t as
exogenous.2 Given the wage it charges in each labor market j ∈ [0,1], the union is assumed
2The case in which the union takes aggregate labor variables as endogenous can be interpreted as an
environment with highly centralized labor unions. Higher-level labor organizations play an important role
in some European and Latin American countries, but are less prominent in the United States.
6to supply enough labor, h
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t /Pt and wt ≡ Wt/Pt. In addition, the total number of hours allocated to the




















Our setup of imperfectly competitive labor markets departs from most existing exposi-
tions of models with nominal wage inertia (e.g., Erceg, et al., 2000). For in these models, it is
assumed that each household supplies a diﬀerentiated type of labor input. This assumption
introduces equilibrium heterogeneity across households in the number of hours worked. To
avoid this heterogeneity from spilling over into consumption heterogeneity, it is typically as-
sumed that preferences are separable in consumption and hours and that ﬁnancial markets
exist that allow agents to fully insure against employment risk. Our formulation has the
advantage that it avoids the need to assume both separability of preferences in leisure and
consumption and the existence of such insurance markets. As we will explain later in more
detail, our speciﬁcation gives rise to a wage-inﬂation Phillips curve with a larger coeﬃcient
on the wage-markup gap than the model with employment heterogeneity across households.
The household is assumed to own physical capital, kt, which accumulates according to
the following law of motion








where it denotes gross investment and δ is a parameter denoting the rate of depreciation of
physical capital. The function S introduces investment adjustment costs. It is assumed that
in the steady state, the function S satisﬁes S = S0 = 0 and S00 > 0. These assumptions
imply the absence of adjustment costs up to ﬁrst-order in the vicinity of the deterministic
steady state.
As in Fisher (2005) and Altig et al. (2005), it is assumed that investment is subject
7to permanent investment-speciﬁc technology shocks. Fisher argues that this type of shock
is needed to explain the observed secular decline in the relative price of investment goods
in terms of consumption goods. More importantly, Fisher shows that investment-speciﬁc
technology shocks account for about 50 percent of aggregate ﬂuctuations at business-cycle
frequencies in the postwar U.S. economy. (As we will discuss below, Altig et al., 2005, ﬁnd
smaller numbers in the context of the model studied in our paper.)
We assume that investment goods are produced from consumption goods by means of
a linear technology whereby 1/Υt units of consumption goods yield one unit of investment
goods, where Υt denotes an exogenous, permanent technology shock in period t. The growth
rate of Υt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the form:
ˆ µΥ,t = ρµΥˆ µΥ,t−1 + ￿µΥ,t,
where ˆ µΥ,t ≡ ln(µΥ,t/µΥ) denotes the percentage deviation of the gross growth rate of in-
vestment speciﬁc technological change and µΥ denotes the steady-state growth rate of Υt.
Owners of physical capital can control the intensity at which this factor is utilized. For-
mally, we let ut measure capacity utilization in period t. We assume that using the stock of
capital with intensity ut entails a cost of Υ
−1
t a(ut)kt units of the composite ﬁnal good. The
function a is assumed to satisfy a(1) = 0, and a0(1),a 00(1) > 0. Both the speciﬁcation of cap-
ital adjustment costs and capacity utilization costs are somewhat peculiar. More standard
formulations assume that adjustment costs depend on the level of investment rather than
on its growth rate, as is assumed here. Also, costs of capacity utilization typically take the
form of a higher rate of depreciation of physical capital. The modeling choice here is guided
by the need to ﬁt the response of investment and capacity utilization to a monetary shock
in the U.S. economy. For further discussion of this issue, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2005).
Households rent the capital stock to ﬁrms at the real rental rate rk
t per unit of capital.
Total income stemming from the rental of capital is given by rk
t utkt. The investment good is
assumed to be a composite good made with the aggregator function shown in equation (2).





As in our earlier related work (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004a,b), we motivate a demand
for money by households by assuming that purchases of consumption goods are subject
to a proportional transaction cost that is increasing in consumption-based money velocity.






is the ratio of consumption to real money balances held by the household, which we denote
by mh
t. The transaction cost function ` satisﬁes the following assumptions: (a) `(v)i s
nonnegative and twice continuously diﬀerentiable; (b) There exists a levelof velocityv > 0, to
which we refer as the satiation level of money, such that `(v)=`0(v) = 0; (c) (v−v)`0(v) > 0
for v 6= v; and (d) 2`0(v)+v`00(v) > 0 for all v ≥ v. Assumption (a) implies that the
transaction process does not generate resources. Assumption (b) ensures that the Friedman
rule, i.e., a zero nominal interest rate, need not be associated with an inﬁnite demand for
money. It also implies that both the transaction cost and the associated distortions in
the intra and intertemporal allocation of consumption and leisure vanish when the nominal
interest rate is zero. Assumption (c) guarantees that in equilibrium money velocity is always
greater than or equal to the satiation level v. As will become clear shortly, assumption (d)
ensures that the demand for money is decreasing in the nominal interest rate. Assumption (d)
is weaker than the more common assumption of strict convexity of the transaction cost
function.
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nominal state-contingent
assets. Speciﬁcally, each period t ≥ 0, consumers can purchase any desired state-contingent
nominal payment Xh
t+1 in period t + 1 at the dollar cost Etrt,t+1Xh
t+1. The variable rt,t+1
denotes a stochastic nominal discount factor between periods t and t + 1. Households pay
real lump-sum taxes in the amount τt per period. The household’s period-by-period budget
constraint is given by:
Etrt,t+1x
h
t+1 + ct[1 + `(vt) ]+Υ
−1
t [it + a(ut)kt]+m
h

























t /Pt denotes the real payoﬀ in period t of nominal state-contingent
assets purchased in period t − 1. The variable φt denotes dividends received from the own-
ership of ﬁrms and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross rate of consumer-price inﬂation.
We introduce wage stickiness in the model by assuming that each period the household
(or unions) cannot set the nominal wage optimally in a fraction ˜ α ∈ [0,1) of randomly chosen
labor markets. In these markets, the wage rate is indexed to average real wage growth and







where ˜ χ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter measuring the degree of wage indexation. When ˜ χ equals 0,
there is no wage indexation. When ˜ χ equals 1, there is full wage indexation to long-run real
wage growth and to past consumer price inﬂation.
The household chooses processes for ct, ht, xh
t+1, w
j
t, kt+1, it, ut, and mh
t so as to maximize
the utility function (1) subject to (6)-(9), the wage stickiness friction, and a no-Ponzi-game
constraint, taking as given the processes wt, rk
t , hd
t, rt,t+1, πt, φt, and τt and the initial
conditions xh
0, k0, and mh
−1. The household’s optimal plan must satisfy constraints (6)-(9).
In addition, letting βtλtwt˜ µt, βtλtqt, and βtλt denote Lagrange multipliers associated with









































































The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ct, xh
t+1, ht, kt+1, it, mh
t, ut, and wi
t, in that order,
are given by
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where ˜ wt denotes the real wage prevailing in the 1 − ˜ α labor markets in which the union
can set wages optimally in period t. Let ˜ ht denote the level of labor eﬀort supplied to those
markets. Because the labor demand curve faced by the union is identical across all labor
markets, and because the cost of supplying labor is the same for all markets, one can assume
that wage rates, ˜ wt, and employment, ˜ ht, are identical across all labor markets updating
wages in a given period. By equation (5), we have that ˜ w
˜ η
t˜ ht = w˜ ηhd
t. It is of use to track the
evolution of real wages in a particular labor market. In any labor market j where the wage
is set optimally in period t, the real wage in that period is ˜ wt. If in period t+1 wages are not
reoptimized in that market, the real wage is ˜ wt(µz∗πt)˜ χ/πt+1. This is because the nominal
wage is indexed by ˜ χ percent of the sum of past price inﬂation and long-run real wage growth.








derive the household’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the wage rate in those markets
where the wage rate is set optimally in the current period, it is convenient to reproduce the

































































































This expression states that in labor markets in which the wage rate is reoptimized in period
11t, the real wage is set so as to equate the union’s future expected average marginal revenue
to the average marginal cost of supplying labor. The union’s marginal revenue s periods
after its last wage reoptimization is given by
˜ η−1







. Here, ˜ η/(˜ η − 1)
represents the markup of wages over marginal cost of labor that would prevail in the absence







in the expression for marginal revenue
reﬂects the fact that as time goes by without a chance to reoptimize, the real wage declines
as the price level increases when wages are imperfectly indexed. In turn, the marginal cost





˜ µt+s . The variable ˜ µt is a wedge between the disutility of labor and
the average real wage prevailing in the economy. Thus, ˜ µt can be interpreted as the average
markup that unions impose on the labor market. The weights used to compute the average
diﬀerence between marginal revenue and marginal cost are decreasing in time and increasing
in the amount of labor supplied to the market.





































































































The household’s optimality conditions imply a liquidity preference function featuring a
negative relation between real balances and the short-term nominal interest rate. To see this,
we ﬁrst note that the absence of arbitrage opportunities in ﬁnancial markets requires that
the gross risk-free nominal interest rate, which we denote by Rt, be equal to the reciprocal
of the price in period t of a nominal security that pays one unit of currency in every state
of period t + 1. Formally, Rt =1 /Etrt,t+1. This relation together with the household’s





which is a standard Euler equation for pricing nominally risk-free assets. Combining this








The right-hand side of this expression represents the opportunity cost of holding money,
which is an increasing function of the nominal interest rate. Given the assumptions regarding
the form of the transactions cost function `, the left-hand side is increasing in money velocity.
Thus, this expression deﬁnes a liquidity preference function that is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate and unit elastic in consumption.
2.2 Firms
Each variety of ﬁnal goods is produced by a single ﬁrm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1] produces output using as factor inputs capital services, kit,
and labor services, hit. The production technology is given by
F(kit,z thit) − ψz
∗
t,
where the function F is assumed to be homogenous of degree one, concave, and strictly in-
creasing in both arguments. The variable zt denotes an aggregate, exogenous, and stochastic
neutral productivity shock. The parameter ψ>0 introduces ﬁxed costs of operating a ﬁrm
in each period. In turn, the presence of ﬁxed costs implies that the production function ex-
hibits increasing returns to scale. We model ﬁxed costs to ensure a realistic proﬁt-to-output
ratio in steady state. Finally, we follow Altig et al. (2005) and assume that ﬁxed costs are









This formulation of ﬁxed costs ensures that along the balanced-growth path ﬁxed costs do
not vanish. Let µz,t ≡ zt/zt−1 denote the gross growth rate of the neutral technology shock.
By assumption, in the non-stochastic steady state µz,t is constant and equal to µz. Also, let
ˆ µz,t = ln(µz,t/µz) denote the percentage deviation of the growth rate of neutral technology
13shocks. Then, the evolution of µz,t is assumed to be given by:
ˆ µz,t = ρµzˆ µz,t−1 + ￿µz,t,
with ￿µz,t ∼ (0,σ2
µz).




yt ≡ ct[1 + `(vt)] + gt +Υ
−1
t [it + a(ut)kt], (21)
denotes aggregate absorption. The variable gt denotes government consumption of the com-
posite good in period t.
We rationalize a demand for money by ﬁrms by imposing that wage payments be sub-




it = νwthit, (22)
where m
f
it denotes the demand for real money balances by ﬁrm i in period t and ν ≥ 0i sa
parameter indicating the fraction of the wage bill that must be backed with monetary assets.




it stemming from the need to
hold money to satisfy the working-capital constraint. Letting the variable φit denote real



















tkit − wthit − φit,
where Etrt,t+1x
f
it+1 denotes the total real cost of one-period state-contingent assets that the
ﬁrm purchases in period t in terms of the composite good.3 We assume that the ﬁrm must
satisfy demand at the posted price. Formally, we impose








3Implicit in this speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s budget constraint is the assumption that ﬁrms rent capital
services from a centralized market. This is a common assumption in the related literature (e.g., Christiano
et al., 2005; Kollmann, 2003; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2003; and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992). A polar
assumption is that capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc, as in Woodford (2003, chapter 5.3) and Sveen and Weinke (2003).
Both assumptions are clearly extreme. A more realistic treatment of investment dynamics would incorporate
a mix of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and homogeneous capital.












k=1 rt+k−1,t+k, for s ≥ 1, denotes the stochastic nominal discount factor
between t and t+s, and rt,t ≡ 1. Firms are assumed to be subject to a borrowing constraint
that prevents them from engaging in Ponzi games.
Clearly, because rt,t+s represents both the ﬁrm’s stochastic discount factor and the market
pricing kernel for ﬁnancial assets, and because the ﬁrm’s objective function is linear in asset
holdings, it follows that any asset accumulation plan of the ﬁrm satisfying the no-Ponzi
constraint is optimal. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the ﬁrm manages its portfolio





it = 0 at all dates and states. Note that this ﬁnancial strategy makes x
f
it+1 state


















The last term on the right-hand side of the above expression for dividends represents the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial costs associated with the cash-in-advance constraint on wages. This ﬁnancial
cost is increasing in the opportunity cost of holding money, 1 − R
−1
t , which in turn is an
increasing function of the short-term nominal interest rate Rt.
Letting rt,t+sPt+smcit+s denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (23),
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s maximization problem with respect to capital and












It is clear from these optimality conditions that the presence of a working-capital requirement
introduces a ﬁnancial cost of labor that is increasing in the nominal interest rate. We note
also that because all ﬁrms face the same factor prices and because they all have access to
the same production technology with the function F being linearly homogeneous, marginal
15costs, mcit, are identical across ﬁrms. Indeed, because the above ﬁrst-order conditions hold
for all ﬁrms independently of whether they are allowed to reset prices optimally, marginal
costs are identical across all ﬁrms in the economy.
Prices are assumed to be sticky ` a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Speciﬁcally, each
period t ≥ 0 a fraction α ∈ [0,1) of randomly picked ﬁrms is not allowed to optimally set
the nominal price of the good they produce. Instead, these ﬁrms index their prices to past
inﬂation according to the rule Pit = Pit−1π
χ
t−1. The interpretation of the parameter χ is the
similar to that of its wage counterpart ˜ χ. The remaining 1−α ﬁrms choose prices optimally.
Consider the price-setting problem faced by a ﬁrm that has the opportunity to reoptimize
the price in period t. This price, which we denote by ˜ Pt, is set so as to maximize the expected

















































































According to this expression, optimizing ﬁrms set nominal prices so as to equate average
future expected marginal revenues to average future expected marginal costs. The weights
used in calculating these averages are decreasing with time and increasing in the size of
the demand for the good produced by the ﬁrm. Under ﬂexible prices (α = 0), the above
optimality condition reduces to a static relation equating marginal costs to marginal revenues
period by period.



















































































Then we can write the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ˜ Pt as
ηx
1
t =( η − 1)x
2
t. (30)
The labor input used by ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1], denoted hit, is assumed to be a composite made
of a continuum of diﬀerentiated labor services, h
j











where the parameter ˜ η>1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across dif-
ferent types of activities. For any given level of hit, the demand for each variety of labor







subject to the aggregation constraint (31), where W
j
t denotes the nominal wage rate paid to























This wage index has the property that the minimum cost of a bundle of intermediate labor
inputs yielding hit units of the composite labor is given by Wthit.
2.3 The Government
Each period, the government consumes gt units of the composite good. We assume that the
government minimizes the cost of producing gt. As a result, public demand for each variety
i ∈ [0,1] of diﬀerentiated goods git is given by git =( Pit/Pt)−ηgt.
17We assume that along the balanced-growth path the share of government spending in
value added is constant, that is, we impose limj→∞ Etgt+j/yt+j = sg, where sg is a constant




where ¯ gt is an exogenous stationary stochastic process. This assumption ensures that gov-


















itdi. For simplicity, we
assume that government debt is zero at time zero and that the ﬁscal authority levies lump-
sum taxes, τt to bridge any gap between seignorage income and government expenditures,
that is, τt = gt − (mt − mt−1/πt). As a consequence, government debt is nil at all times.
We postpone the presentation of the monetary policy regime until after we characterize
a competitive equilibrium.
2.4 Aggregation
We limit attention to a symmetric equilibrium in which all ﬁrms that have the opportunity to
change their price optimally at a given time choose the same price. It then follows from (4)




t−1)1−η +( 1− α) ˜ P
1−η
t .







t−1 +( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t . (34)
2.4.1 Market Clearing in the Final Goods Market
Naturally, the set of equilibrium conditions includes a resource constraint. Such a restriction
is typically of the type F(kt,z tht)−ψz∗
t = ct[1+`(vt)]+gt+Υ
−1
t [it+a(ut)kt]. In the present
model, however, this restriction is not valid. This is because the model implies relative price
dispersion across varieties. This price dispersion, which is induced by the assumed nature
of price stickiness, is ineﬃcient and entails output loss. To see this, consider the following
expression stating that supply must equal demand at the ﬁrm level:




[1 + `(vt)]ct + gt +Υ
−1







18Integrating over all ﬁrms and taking into account that (a) the capital-labor ratio is common
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with s−1 given. The state variable st summarizes the resource costs induced by the ineﬃcient
price dispersion featured in the Calvo model in equilibrium. Three observations are in order
about the price dispersion measure st. First, st is bounded below by 1. That is, price
dispersion is always a costly distortion in this model. To see that st is bounded below by 1,








it . Then, taking into account









Second, in an economy where the non-stochastic level of inﬂation is nil (i.e., when π =1 )
or where prices are fully indexed to any variable ωt with the property that its deterministic
steady-state level equals the deterministic steady-state value of inﬂation (i.e., ω = π), then
the variable st follows, up to ﬁrst order, the univariate autoregressive process ˆ st = αˆ st−1.
In these cases, the price dispersion measure st has no ﬁrst-order real consequences for the
stationary distribution of any endogenous variable of the model. This means that studies that
restrict attention to linear approximations to the equilibriumconditions are justiﬁed to ignore
the variable st if the model features no price dispersion in the deterministic steady state.
But st matters up to ﬁrst order when the deterministic steady state features movements in
relative prices across goods varieties. More importantly, the price dispersion variable st must
be taken into account if one is interested in higher-order approximations to the equilibrium
conditions even if relative prices are stable in the deterministic steady state. Omitting st
in higher-order expansions would amount to leaving out certain higher-order terms while
including others. Finally, when prices are fully ﬂexible, α = 0, we have that ˜ pt = 1 and
thus st = 1. (Obviously, in a ﬂexible-price equilibrium there is no price dispersion across
varieties.)
As discussed above, equilibrium marginal costs and capital-labor ratios are identical
across ﬁrms. Therefore, one can aggregate the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions with respect to
















2.4.2 Market Clearing in the Labor Market
It follows from equation (32) that the aggregate demand for labor of type j ∈ [0,1], which






















0 hitdi denotes the aggregate demand for the composite labor input. Taking
into account that at any point in time the nominal wage rate is identical across all labor
markets at which wages are allowed to change optimally, we have that labor demand in each









Combining this expression with equation (39), describing the demand for labor of type
j ∈ [0,1], and with the time constraint (6), which must hold with equality, we can write























. The variable ˜ st measures the degree of




The state variable ˜ st evolves over time according to














We note that because all job varieties are ex-ante identical, any wage dispersion is ineﬃcient.
This is reﬂected in the fact that ˜ st is bounded below by 1. The proof of this statement is
identical to that oﬀered earlier for the fact that st is bounded below by unity. To see this, note







di. This ineﬃciency introduces a wedge that makes
the number of hours supplied to the market, ht, larger than the number of productive units
of labor input, hd
t. In an environment without long-run wage dispersion, the dead-weight
loss created by wage dispersion is nil up to ﬁrst order. Formally, a ﬁrst-order approximation
of the law of motion of ˜ st yields a univariate autoregressive process of the form ˆ ˜ st =˜ αˆ ˜ st−1,
as long as there is no wage dispersion in the deterministic steady state. When wages are
fully ﬂexible, ˜ α = 0, wage dispersion disappears, and thus ˜ st equals 1.
It follows from our deﬁnition of the wage index given in equation (33) that in equilibrium
the real wage rate must satisfy
w
1−˜ η










21Aggregating the expression for ﬁrm’s proﬁts given in equation (24) yields
φt = yt − r
k
t utkt − wth
d











and the government budget constraint is given by
τt = gt − (mt − mt−1/πt). (45)
2.5 Functional Forms













The functional form for the investment adjustment cost function is taken from Christiano,















where µI is the steady-state growth rate of investment.
Following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a,b) we assume that the transaction cost tech-
nology takes the form
`(v)=φ1v + φ2/v − 2
p
φ1φ2. (47)












Note the existence of a satiation point for consumption-based money velocity, v, equal to
p
φ2/φ1. Also, the implied money demand is unit elastic with respect to consumption expen-
ditures. This feature is a consequence of the assumption that transaction costs, c`(c/m), are
22homogenous of degree one in consumption and real balances and is independent of the par-
ticular functional form assumed for `(·). Further, as the parameter φ2 approaches zero, the
transaction cost function `(·) becomes linear in velocity and the demand for money adopts
the Baumol-Tobin square root form with respect to the opportunity cost of holding money,
(R − 1)/R. That is, the log-log elasticity of money demand with respect to the opportunity
cost of holding money converges to 1/2, as φ2 vanishes.
The costs of higher capacity utilization are parameterized as follows:






This economy features two types of permanent shocks. As a result, a number of variables,
such as output and the real wage, will not be stationary along the balanced-growth path.
We therefore perform a change of variables so as to obtain a set of equilibrium conditions
that involve only stationary variables. To this end we note that the variables ct, mh
t, mt,
wt,˜ wt, yt, gt, φt, x1
t, x2
t, and τt are cointegrated with z∗
t. Similarly, the variables kt+1 and it
are cointegrated with Υtz∗




t are cointegrated with 1/Υt, and the variables f1
t and f2
t are cointegrated with
z∗
t
(1−φ3)(1−φ4). We therefore divide these variables by the appropriate cointegrating factor
and denote the corresponding stationary variables with capital letters.
2.7 Competitive Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary processes ut, Ct, ht, It, Kt+1,
vt, Mh
t , Mt,Λ t, πt, Wt,˜ µt, Qt, Rk
t,Φ t, F 1
t , F 2
t , ˜ Wt, hd
t, Yt,m c t, X1
t , X2
t ,˜ pt, st,˜ st, and
Tt satisfying (7), (8), (10), (12)-(21), (28)-(30), (34)-(38), and (40)-(45) written in terms of
the stationary variables, given exogenous stochastic processes µΥ,t, µz,t, and ¯ gt, the policy
process, Rt, and initial conditions c−1, w−1, s−1,˜ s−1, π−1, i−1, and k0. A complete list of the
competitive equilibrium conditions in terms of stationary variables is given in the technical
appendix to this paper (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2005b).
2.8 Ramsey Equilibrium
We assume that at t = 0 the benevolent government has been operating for an inﬁnite number
of periods. In choosing optimal policy, the government is assumed to honor commitments
made in the past. This form of policy commitment has been referred to as ‘optimal from
the timeless perspective’ (Woodford, 2003).
23Formally, we deﬁne a Ramsey equilibrium as a set of stationary processes ut, Ct, ht, It,
Kt+1, vt, Mh
t , Mt,Λ t, πt, Wt,˜ µt, Qt, Rk
t,Φ t, F 1
t , F 2
t , ˜ Wt, hd
t, Yt,m c t, X1
t , X2
t ,˜ pt, st,˜ st,T t,





















subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (7), (8), (10), (12)-(21), (28)-(30), (34)-
(38), and (40)-(45) written in stationary variables, and Rt ≥ 1, for t>−∞, given exogenous
stochastic processes µz,t, µΥ,t, and ¯ gt, values of the variables listed above dated t<0, and
values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints listed above dated t<0.
Technically, the diﬀerence between the usual Ramsey equilibrium concept and the one
employed here is that here the structure of the optimality conditions associated with the
Ramsey equilibrium is time invariant. By contrast, under the standard Ramsey equilibrium
deﬁnition, the equilibrium conditions in the initial periods are diﬀerent from those applying
to later periods.
Our approach to analyzing the business-cycle properties of Ramsey-optimal policy is
comparable to that in the existing literature under the standard deﬁnition of Ramsey op-
timality (e.g., Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1995). The reason is that existing studies of
business cycles under the standard Ramsey policy focus on the behavior of the economy in
the stochastic steady state (i.e., they limit attention to the properties of equilibrium time
series excluding the initial transition).
3 Calibration
The time unit is meant to be one quarter. For most of the calibration we draw on the paper
by Altig et al. (2005) (hereafter ACEL). We assign most of the parameter values from the
‘high-markup’ case of the ACEL estimation results. In this case, the steady-state markup
in product markets is 20 percent (or η = 6).
Following ACEL, we assume that in the deterministic steady state of the competitive
equilibrium the rate of capacity utilization equals one (u = 1) and proﬁts are zero (φ =
0). ACEL calibrate the discount factor, β,t ob e1 .03−1/4, the depreciation rate, δ,t ob e
0.025, and the capital share, θ, to be 0.36. ACEL assume that preferences are separable
in consumption and leisure and logarithmic in habit-adjusted consumption (φ3 = 1). Their
assumed functional form for the period utility function implies a unit Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. ACEL assume a steady-state markup of wages over the marginal rate of substitution
24between leisure and consumption of 5 percent (or ˜ η = 21).
ACEL estimate the degree of nominal wage stickiness to be slightly above 3 quarters
(˜ α =0 .69). They also estimate the degree of habit formation measured by the parameter b
to be 0.69, the elasticity of the marginal capital adjustment cost, κ, to be 2.79, the elasticity
of the marginal cost of capacity utilization, γ2/γ1, to be 1.46, and the annualized interest
semielasticity of money demand by households, (1/4)∂ ln(mh
t)/∂(Rt), to be -0.81.
ACEL estimate the parameters of the exogenous stochastic processes for the investment-
speciﬁc and neutral technology shocks µΥ,t and µz,t to be, respectively, (µΥ,σ µΥ,ρ µΥ)=
(1.0042,0.0031,0.20) and (µz,σ µz,ρ µz)=( 1 .00213,0.0007,0.89).
ACEL estimate the degree of price stickiness to be 5 quarters (or α =0 .8) when capital
is not ﬁrm speciﬁc, which is the assumption maintained in this paper.
We do not draw from the work of ACEL to calibrate the degree of indexation in product
prices and wages. The reason is that in their study the parameters governing the degree
of indexation are not estimated. They simply assume full indexation of all prices to past
product price inﬂation. Instead, we draw from the econometric work of Cogley and Sbordone
(2005) and Levin et al. (2005) who ﬁnd no evidence of indexation in product prices. We
therefore set χ =0 . At the same time, Levin et al. estimate a high degree of indexation in
nominal wages. We therefore assume that ˜ χ =1 , which happens to be the value assumed in
ACEL.
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), hereafter CEE, we set the steady-
state share of money held by households, mh/m, to 0.44. Using postwar U.S. data, we
measure the average money-to-output ratio as the ratio of M1 to GDP, and set it equal to
17 percent per year. Neither ACEL nor CEE impose this calibration restriction. Instead,
they assume that all of the wage bill is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint—i.e., they
impose ν = 1. By contrast, our calibration implies that only 60 percent of wage payments
must be held in money (or ν =0 .6).
In calibrating the model we assume that in the deterministic steady state of the compet-
itive equilibrium the rate of inﬂation equals 4.2 percent per year. This value coincides with
the average growth rate of the U.S. postwar GDP deﬂator.
ACEL do not consider government purchases shocks. One study that estimates the
process for government purchases in the context of a model similar to the one we are studying
is Ravn (2005) and we use his ﬁndings to calibrate this process. Speciﬁcally, Ravn estimates
ρg =0 .9 and σ￿g =0 .008. Finally, we impose that the steady-state share of government
consumption in value added is 17 percent, which equals the average value observed in the
United States over the postwar period.
Table 1 presents the values of the deep structural parameters implied by our calibration
25strategy.
4 The Ramsey Steady State
In this section, we characterize the long-run state of the Ramsey equilibrium in an economy
without uncertainty. We refer to this state as the Ramsey steady state. Note that the Ramsey
steady state is in general diﬀerent from the allocation/policy that maximizes welfare in the
steady state of a competitive equilibrium.
In most existing studies on optimal monetary policy in economies with neo-Keynesian
features, the task of characterizing the Ramsey steady state is trivial. The reason is that
these studies assume the existence of a single nominal distortion, namely sluggish adjustment
in nominal product or factor prices or both. In this case, the optimal rate of inﬂation in
the Ramsey steady state is nil. By contrast, the economy studied in this paper features
additional nominal frictions in the form of money demand by households and ﬁrms. This
feature complicates the computation of the Ramsey steady state in the context of the rich
theoretical environment studied in this paper.
Two exceptions to the common practice of abstracting from money demand in anal-
ysis of optimal monetary policy in the neo-Keynesian model are Khan et al. (2003) and
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a). In both of these studies, the computation of the Ramsey
steady state is relatively straight forward because of the simplicity of the theoretical struc-
tures considered. In particular, neither study features wage stickiness, capital accumulation,
habit formation, variable capacity utilization, or factor adjustment costs. When all of these
complications are added, it becomes virtually impossible to characterize the Ramsey steady
state conditions analytically. A contribution of the research project to which this paper
belongs is the development of a general algorithm to characterize and numerically solve the
Ramsey equilibrium in medium-scale macroeconomic models. This algorithm yields an exact
numerical solution for the Ramsey steady-state equilibrium.
4.1 Price Stickiness and the Optimal Inﬂation Rate
We ﬁnd that the most striking characteristic of the Ramsey steady state is the high sensitivity
of the optimal rate of inﬂation with respect to the parameter governing the degree of price
stickiness, α, for the range of values of this parameter that is empirically relevant.
Available empirical estimates of the degree of price rigidity using macroeconomic data
vary from 2 to 5 quarters, or α ∈ [0.5,0.8]. For example, CEE (2005) in the context of
a model similar to ours estimate α to be 0.6. By contrast, ACEL (2005), using a model
26Table 1: Structural Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 1.031/4 Subjective discount factor (quarterly)
θ 0.36 Share of capital in value added
ψ 0.25 Fixed cost parameter
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate (quarterly)
ν 0.6011 Fraction of wage bill subject to a CIA constraint
η 6 Price-elasticity of demand for a speciﬁc good variety
˜ η 21 Wage-elasticity of demand for a speciﬁc labor variety
α 0.8 Fraction of ﬁrms not setting prices optimally each quarter
˜ α 0.69 Fraction of labor markets not setting wages optimally each quarter
b 0.69 Degree of habit persistence
φ1 0.0459 Transaction cost parameter
φ2 0.1257 Transaction cost parameter
φ3 1 Preference parameter
φ4 0.5301 Preference parameter
κ 2.79 Parameter governing investment adjustment costs
γ1 0.0412 Parameter of capacity-utilization cost function
γ2 0.0601 Parameter of capacity-utilization cost function
χ 0 Degree of price indexation
˜ χ 1 Degree of wage indexation
µΥ 1.0042 Quarterly growth rate of investment-speciﬁc technological change
σµΥ 0.0031 Std. dev. of the innovation to the investment-speciﬁc technology shock
ρµΥ 0.20 Serial correlation of the log of the investment-speciﬁc technology shock
µz 1.00213 Quarterly growth rate of neutral technology shock
σµz 0.0007 Std. dev. of the innovation to the neutral technology shock
ρµz 0.89 Serial correlation of the log of the neutral technology shock
¯ g 0.2141 Steady-state value of government consumption (quarterly)
σ￿g 0.008 Std. dev. of the innovation to log of gov. consumption
ρg 0.9 Serial correlation of the log of government spending
27Figure 1: Degree of Price Stickiness and the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation
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   CEE
* Benchmark Parameter Value
Note: CEE and ACEL indicate, respectively, the parameter values estimated by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2005). All parame-
ters other than α take their baseline values, given in table 1.
identical to the present one, estimate an marginal-cost-gap coeﬃcient in the Phillips curve
that is consistent with a value of α of around 0.8 when the market for capital is assumed to
be centralized, as is maintained in our formulation.4 Both CEE and ACEL use an impulse-
response matching technique to estimate α. Bayesian estimates of this parameter include
Del Negro et al. (2004) and Levin et al. (2005) who report posterior means of 0.67 and 0.83,
respectively, and 90-percent probability intervals of (0.51,0.83) and (0.81,0.86), respectively.
Evidence on price stickiness based on microeconomic data suggest a much higher frequency
of price changes than the evidence based on macro data. The ﬁndings reported in Bils and
Klenow (2004) and Golosov and Lucas (2003), for example, suggest values of α of around
1/3, or a degree of price stickiness of about 1.5 quarters.
Figure 1 displays the relationship between the degree of price stickiness, α, and the
optimal rate of inﬂation in percent per year, π. When α equals 0.5, the lower range of the
4If, instead, capital accumulation is assumed to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc, then ACEL’s estimate of the Phillips
curve is consistent with a value of α of about 0.7.
28available empirical evidence using macro data, the optimal rate of inﬂation is -4 percent,
virtually equal to the level called for by the Friedman rule. For our baseline value of α of
0.8, which is near the upper range of the available empirical evidence using macro data, the
optimal level of inﬂation rises to -0.4 percent, which is close to price stability. Also evident
from ﬁgure 1 is the fact that values of α based on microeconomic evidence, around 1/3,
imply that the Friedman rule is Ramsey optimal in the long-run.
The above analysis suggests that it is of outmost importance to devote further research
into reﬁning the available estimates of the degree of price stickiness. This research should
aim not only at narrowing the range of values that stem from macro evidence but also at
reconciling the apparent disconnect between estimates emerging from macro and micro data.
Besides the uncertainty surrounding the estimation of the degree of price stickiness, a
second aspect of the apparent diﬃculty in establishing reliably the long-run level of inﬂation
has to do with the shape of the relationship linking the degree of price stickiness to the
optimal level of inﬂation. The problem resides in the fact that this relationship becomes
signiﬁcantly steep precisely for that range of values of α that is empirically most compelling.
The problem would not arise if the steep portion of the relationship would take place at
values of α below 1/3 or above 0.8, say. It turns out that an important factor determining
the shape of the function relating the optimal levelof inﬂation to the degree of price stickiness
is the underlying ﬁscal policy regime.
4.2 Fiscal Policy and the Optimal Inﬂation Rate
In this paper, we follow the widespread practice in the literature on optimal monetary policy
in the neo-Keynesian framework of ignoring ﬁscal considerations by implicitly or explicitly
assuming the existence of lump-sum, nondistorting taxes that balance the government budget
at all times and under all circumstances. This assumption is clearly unrealistic and usually
maintained on the sole basis of simplicity. We wish to argue that taking explicitly into
account the ﬁscal side of the optimal policy problem has crucial consequences for the optimal
long-run level of inﬂation.
Fiscal considerations fundamentally change the long-run tradeoﬀ between price stability
and the Friedman rule. To see this, we now brieﬂy consider an economy where lump-sum
taxes are unavailable. Instead, the ﬁscal authority must ﬁnance government purchases by
means of proportional capital and labor income taxes. The social planner sets jointly mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy in a Ramsey-optimal fashion. The details of this environment are
contained in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2005a). Figure 2 displays the relationship between
the degree of price stickiness, α, and the optimal rate of inﬂation, π. The solid line cor-
29Figure 2: Price Stickiness, Fiscal Policy, and Optimal Inﬂation
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Note: CEE and ACEL indicate, respectively, the values for the parameter α used
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2005).
30responds to the baseline case considered in this paper (featuring lump-sum taxes).5 The
dash-circled line corresponds to the economy with optimally chosen income taxes analyzed
in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2005a).6 In stark contrast to what happens under lump-sum
taxation, under optimal distortionary taxation the function linking π and α is ﬂat and very
close to zero for the entire range of macro-data-based empirically plausible values of α,
namely 0.5 to 0.8. In other words, when taxes are distortionary and optimally determined,
price stability emerges as a prediction that is robust to the existing uncertainty about the
exact degree of price stickiness. Even if one focuses on the evidence of price stickiness stem-
ming from micro data, the model with distortionary Ramsey taxation predicts an optimal
long-run level of inﬂation that is much closer to zero than to the level predicted by the
Friedman rule.
Our intuition for why price stability arises as a robust policy recommendation in the
economy with optimally set distortionary taxation runs as follows. Consider the economy
with lump-sum taxation. Deviating from the Friedman rule (by raising the inﬂation rate) has
the beneﬁt of reducing the price dispersion that originates in the presence of price stickiness.
Consider next the economy with Ramsey-optimal income taxation and no lump-sum taxes.
In this economy, deviating from the Friedman rule still provides the beneﬁt of reducing
price dispersion. However, in this economy increasing inﬂation has the additional beneﬁt
of increasing seignorage revenue thereby allowing the social planner to lower distortionary
income tax rates. Therefore, the Friedman-rule versus price-stability tradeoﬀ is tilted in
favor of price stability.
It follows from this intuition that what is essential in inducing the optimality of price
stability is that on the margin the ﬁscal authority trades oﬀ the inﬂation tax for regular
taxation. Indeed, it can be shown that if distortionary tax rates are ﬁxed, even if they are
ﬁxed at the level that is optimal in a world without lump-sum taxes, and the ﬁscal authority
has access to lump-sum taxes on the margin, the optimal rate of inﬂation is much closer to
the Friedman rule than to zero. In this case, increasing inﬂation no longer has the beneﬁt of
reducing distortionary taxes. As a result, the Ramsey planner has less incentives to inﬂate.
5In producing the solid line shown in ﬁgure 2, all structural parameters take their baseline values shown
in table 1 except for the long-run growth rates of the two productivity shocks, which are set to zero. This
deviation from the baseline calibration is necessary to preserve comparability with the model in Schmitt-
Groh´ e and Uribe (2005a), which features no long-run growth. The solid line looks essentially like the one
shown in ﬁgure 1, with the only diﬀerence that at the Friedman rule the inﬂation rate is -2.9 percent, whereas
in ﬁgure 1 it is -4.6 percent. This diﬀerence is explained by the lack of growth in the model used to produce
the solid line in ﬁgure 2.
6In producing the dash-circled line shown in ﬁgure 2, we set all structural parameter values to those
shown in table 1 in the present paper, except for those governing long-run growth, which are set to zero.
The model economy features proportional labor, capital, and proﬁt taxes. The proﬁt tax rate is constrained
to be equal to the capital income tax rate. Government transfers are set to zero.
31Figure 3: Degree of Price Indexation and the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation















* Benchmark Parameter Value
Note: CEE and ACEL indicate, respectively, the value of χ used by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2005). All parameters other
than χ take their baseline values, given in table 1.
4.3 Price Indexation and the Optimal Inﬂation Rate
The parameter χ measuring the degree of price indexation is crucial in determining the
optimal level of long-run inﬂation. The reason is that when prices are fully indexed (χ =
1), price dispersion disappears in the deterministic steady state. As a result the social
planner faces no longer a tradeoﬀ between minimizing price dispersion and minimizing the
opportunity cost of holding money. In such an environment, the Friedman rule is Ramsey
optimal. In the absence of perfect indexation (χ<1), any deviation from zero inﬂation
will entail price dispersion, and the lower the degree of indexation, the higher will be the
price dispersion associated with a given level of inﬂation. Consequently, the Ramsey optimal
deﬂation rate is increasing in the degree of price indexation.
Figure 3 shows that the Ramsey optimal inﬂation rate is indeed a decreasing function of
the indexation parameter χ. CEE and ACEL assume that prices are perfectly indexed to
lagged inﬂation, that is, they calibrate the parameter χ to be unity. Under this assumption,
the Friedman rule is optimal in the deterministic Ramsey steady state. However, the few
32Figure 4: Money Demand and the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation
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values, given in table 1.
existing studies that attempt to estimate econometrically the indexation parameter χ ﬁnd
little empirical support for price indexation. For example, Levin et al. (2005) using Bayesian
methods report a tight estimate of χ of 0.08. Similarly, Cogley and Sbordone (2005) using
a diﬀerent empirical strategy than Levin et al. also ﬁnd virtually no evidence of price
indexation in U.S. data. As we argued above, these two empirical studies motivate our
setting χ =0 .
4.4 Money Demand and the Optimal Inﬂation Rate
Given the long-run policy tradeoﬀs present in the model—namely, minimizing the opportu-
nity cost of holding money (by setting Rt = 1) versus minimizing price dispersion (by setting
πt = 1)—one should expect that the larger is the money demand friction, the closer is the
optimal rate of inﬂation to the one prescribed by the Friedman rule. Figure 4 displays the
optimal rate of inﬂation as a function of the two structural parameters deﬁning the demand
for money by households, φ1 and φ2. The ﬁgure suggests that the optimal rate of inﬂation
is rather insensitive to changes in these two parameters. For instance, at the baseline value
of 0.05 for the parameter φ1, the optimal rate of inﬂation is -0.4 percent per year and money
demand is 17 percent of GDP. If one increases φ1 by a factor of 10 to 0.5, the optimal rate of
deﬂation is still small at only 1 percent, but the demand for money doubles to 35 percent of
GDP. One must increase φ1 by a factor of more than 150 to around 8 to induce an optimal
inﬂation rate close to the Friedman rule. At this value of φ1, the demand for money is larger
than one entire annual GDP.
33The reason for the implied low sensitivity of the Ramsey inﬂation rate with respect to
the parameters deﬁning the demand for money is the assumed high degree of price stickiness.
This distortion is so dominant in the present model that optimal policy is overwhelmingly
geared toward price stability. As a result, low inﬂation survives as the overriding goal of
monetary policy even for economically large values of the money demand distortion. If
one lowers the degree of price stickiness, the optimal rate of inﬂation becomes much more
sensitive with respect the transaction-cost parameter φ1. Figure 4 displays with a dashed
line the relationship between the optimal rate of inﬂation and the parameters φ1 and φ2 when
the sticky-price parameter α takes the value 0.6. In this case, the optimal rate of inﬂation
falls from near price stability to the Friedman rule much faster as one increases φ1 than in
the baseline case in which α is 0.8.
A similarmessage emerges as one varies the other transaction cost parameter, φ2. Only for
economically implausible values of φ2 (ones implying extremely high interest-rate elasticities
of money demand) does the Friedman rule emerge as Ramsey optimal.
4.5 Implications for Inﬂation Targeting
A robust implication of the ACEL model studied here is that the central bank should target
mild deﬂation. This implication is at odds with the observed inﬂation goals among the
by-now large number of industrialized and emerging-market countries that self-identify their
monetary policy as inﬂation targeting. In industrialized countries, inﬂation targets typically
lie in the rage of 2 to 3 percent per year. Inﬂation targets are somewhat higher in developing
countries.
It is therefore a challenge for monetary policy to square theoretically optimal inﬂation
targets with actual ones. One reason often oﬀered for why the inﬂation target should be
positive is that too low an inﬂation target (in particular, zero or negative targets) would leave
the central bank too close to the zero bound on nominal interest rates, thereby impairing the
monetary authority’s ability to steer the economy out of recession. Our analysis thus far is
necessarily mute on this point because we have limited attention to a characterization of the
Ramsey steady state. In order to ascertain whether the zero bound will indeed be frequently
visited under the Ramsey optimal stabilization policy, a dynamic equilibrium analysis must
be carried out. We turn to this matter next.
345 Ramsey Dynamics
In this section, we characterize the business cycle dynamics that arise in the stochastic
steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. We approximate the Ramsey equilibrium dynam-
ics by solving a ﬁrst-order approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions. There is
evidence that ﬁrst-order approximations to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions deliver dy-
namics that are fairly close to those associated with the exact solution. For instance, in
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) we compute the exact solution to the Ramsey equilibrium
in a ﬂexible-price dynamic economy with money, income taxes, and monopolistic competi-
tion in product markets. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) we compute the solution to
the exact same economy using a ﬁrst-order approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium condi-
tions. We ﬁnd that the exact solution is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one based on a
ﬁrst-order approximation. More recently, Benigno and Woodford (2005) have shown, in the
context of optimal taxation in the standard RBC model, that the ﬁrst-order approximation
to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions implies second moments that are similar to the second
moments computed from an approximation based on a minimum-weighted-residual method
reported in Chari et al. (1995).
5.1 Is the Zero Bound an Impediment to Optimal Policy?
As mentioned earlier, one argument against setting a zero or negative inﬂation target, as
recommended by the present model, is that at zero or negative rates of inﬂation the risk
of hitting the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates would severely restrict the central
bank’s ability to conduct successful stabilization policy. This argument is made explicit in
Summers (1991), for example. Table 2 reports the standard deviations of the nominal interest
rate as well as other key macroeconomic variables under the Ramsey optimal stabilization
policy. In computing these second moments, all structural parameters of the model take
the values shown in table 1. The table shows that the standard deviation of the nominal
interest rate is only 0.4 percentage points at an annual rate. At the same time, the Ramsey
steady-state level of the nominal interest rate is 4.4 percent. These two ﬁgures taken together
imply that for the nominal interest rate to hit the zero bound, it must fall more than 10
standard deviations below its target level. The probability of this happening is so small that
in the context of the estimated medium-scale model studied in this paper, the zero bound on
nominal interest rates does not impose an economically important constraint on the conduct
of optimal monetary policy.
This conclusion appears to be robust to changes in the degree of price or wage stickiness
within the range of available empirical estimates for the parameters determining the degree
35Table 2: Ramsey Optimal Stabilization Policy: Second Moments
Variable α =0 .8 α =0 .8 α =0 .6
˜ α =0 .69 ˜ α =0 .9˜ α =0 .69
Standard Deviation
Nominal Interest Rate 0.4 0.4 0.3
Price Inﬂation 0.1 0.4 0.2
Wage Inﬂation 1.2 1.0 1.2
Output Growth 0.8 0.8 0.8
Consumption Growth 0.5 0.5 0.5
Investment Growth 1.3 1.5 1.3
Serial Correlation
Nominal Interest Rate 0.9 0.8 0.9
Price Inﬂation 0.8 0.9 0.8
Wage Inﬂation 0.7 0.5 0.6
Output Growth 0.4 0.5 0.5
Consumption Growth 0.9 0.9 0.9
Investment Growth 0.8 0.7 0.8
Correlation with Output Growth
Nominal Interest Rate 0.4 0.0 0.3
Price Inﬂation -0.3 -0.5 -0.4
Wage Inﬂation 0.6 0.4 0.6
Output Growth 1.0 1.0 1
Consumption Growth 0.4 0.4 0.4
Investment Growth 0.4 0.5 0.4
The standard deviation is measured in percentage points per year.
36of nominal sluggishness (see columns 2 and 3 of table 2).
5.2 Optimality of Inﬂation Stability
The Ramsey authority faces a three-dimensional tradeoﬀ in determining the optimal degree
of inﬂation volatility. The sticky price distortion in isolation calls for minimizing inﬂation
volatility. The money demand distortion, on the other hand, calls for stabilizing the op-
portunity cost of holding money, that is, minimizing the standard deviation of Rt. Finally,
the sticky wage distortion renders stabilization of wage inﬂation (in the absence of indexa-
tion) or stabilization of wage inﬂation net of lagged price inﬂation (under full indexation to
past price inﬂation) Ramsey optimal. Table 2 shows that this three-way tradeoﬀ is resolved
overwhelmingly in favor of inﬂation stability.
To see how sensitive the inﬂation stability goal is with respect to the size of the sticky
wage distortion, we also consider the case of ˜ α =0 .9, which implies that unions reoptimize
wages only every 10 quarters. In this case, as expected, the optimal volatility of price
inﬂation increases and that of wage inﬂation falls. The optimal standard deviation of price
inﬂation is now 0.4 percent per year and the optimal standard deviation of wage inﬂation is
now 1.0 percent. Yet, price inﬂation continues to be signiﬁcant smoother over the business
cycle than wage inﬂation. We conclude that a central characteristic of optimal stabilization
policy is smooth inﬂation rates. In this sense, one could say that the Ramsey planner pursues
a policy of inﬂation targeting.
5.3 Ramsey Optimal Impulse Responses and Variance Decompo-
sition
Optimal stabilization policy will in general be shaped by the number and nature of the
exogenous shocks generating aggregate ﬂuctuations. There is considerable debate in the
empirical literature about the identiﬁcation of the main sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
One branch of the literature uses structural vector autoregression analysis to identify speciﬁc
structural shocks. Examples of this approach are Altig et al. (2005) and Fisher (2005). The
work of Fisher (2005) suggests that investment speciﬁc technology shocks may explain as
much as 50 percent of variations in hours worked. Altig et al. identify monetary policy shocks
and investment-speciﬁc as well as neutral technology shocks. They ﬁnd that investment-
speciﬁc shocks play a smaller role in generating business cycles: speciﬁcally, they estimate
that neutral and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks together explain only about one third
of the ﬂuctuations in hours, output, and consumption.
37Table 3: Percent of variance explained by each of the three exogenous disturbances in the
Ramsey equilibrium
Variable µΥ,t µz,t gt
lnyt/yt−1 0.11 0.44 0.45
lnct/ct−1 0.10 0.80 0.10
lnIt/It−1 0.61 0.33 0.06
lnRt 0.21 0.62 0.17
lnπt 0.13 0.83 0.04
lnπW
t 0.37 0.63 0.00
lnhd
t 0.47 0.44 0.09
On the other hand, there is a very active recent literature that uses Bayesian methods
to estimate the entire data generating process of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model. The paper of Smets and Wouters (2004) is a key example of this line of research.
Those authors estimate a model with 10 shocks. One might consider using all of those
10 estimated shocks in the optimal policy problem. However, in econometrically estimated
versions of the model studied in this paper (or variations thereof), it is often the case that
many of these shocks are diﬃcult to interpret economically. In eﬀect, these shocks, to a
large extent, represent simple econometric residuals reﬂecting the distance between model
and data rather than true sources of business-cycle ﬂuctuations. A case in point are shocks
to Euler equations or markup shocks. Before incorporating this type of residual as driving
forces, it is perhaps more productive to give theory a chance to get closer to the data.
Therefore, we do not attempt to build a model that includes all sources of ﬂuctuations. We
simply focus on three shocks that have been shown in the empirical literature to explain
a signiﬁcant fraction of aggregate ﬂuctuations. Namely, neutral and investment-speciﬁc
technology shocks and government purchases shocks.
Table 3 shows how important each of these three shocks is in explaining short-run ﬂuctu-
ations under the Ramsey regime. Variations in output growth are explained in equal parts
by government purchases shocks and neutral technology shocks, which each account for 45
percent of output growth variance. Investment-speciﬁc productivity shocks play a minor role
in driving ﬂuctuations in output growth. However, investment-speciﬁc shocks are important
in explaining movements in hours worked (47 percent), wage inﬂation (37 percent), and in-
vestment growth (61 percent). Fluctuations in consumption growth, the nominal interest
rate, inﬂation, and wage inﬂation are mainly driven by neutral productivity shocks with a
small contribution of government purchases shocks.
Figure 5 shows the model’s response to a one percentage increase in the growth rate
38Figure 5: Ramsey Response To A Neutral Productivity Shock


























































Note: The size of the initial innovation to the neutral technology shock is one
percent, ln(µz,0/µz) = 1%. The nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate
are expressed in levels in percent per year. Output, wages, investment, and
consumption are expressed in cumulative growth rates in percent. Hours and
capacity utilization are expressed in percentage deviations from their respective
steady-state values.
39of the neutral technology shock (ln(µz,0/µz) = 1%). The Ramsey planner raises nominal
interest rates by 175 basis points on impact and allows inﬂation to fall slightly by 45 basis
points. This monetary tightening is short lived however, after 6 quarters the nominal interest
rate is back at 5 percent, or 50 basis points above its long run target. We conjecture that
the reason for this tightening is as follows. The Ramsey planner aims to replicate the real
allocation associated with the ﬂexible-price ﬂexible-wage economy. In such an economy,
the real interest rate would rise at least temporarily in response to a positive shock to the
growth rate of technology. With sluggish nominal price adjustment, the Ramsey planner
would like to induce a rise in the real interest rate without relying in costly movements in
the inﬂation rate. Because the real interest rate equals the risk free nominal interest rate
minus the inﬂation rate, it follows that the Ramsey-optimal policy is to raise nominal interest
rates roughly by the amount that real interest rates would rise in the ﬂexible-price economy.
Interestingly, nominal interest rates are tightened not to avoid inﬂation, but rather to avoid
deﬂation.
Currently, there exists an active debate surrounding the estimated eﬀects of neutral
technology shocks on hours. For example, Gal´ ı (1999) ﬁnds that hours decline on impact
whereas ACEL ﬁnd that hours increase. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Gal´ ı, our model
predicts that under the Ramsey policy hours decline on impact in response to a positive
innovation in the neutral technology shock. Our intuition for the initial decline in hours is as
follows. Because monetary policy induces a sharp increase in real interest rates on impact,
the wealth eﬀect on consumption is muted initially. Additionally, due to the presence of
adjustment costs in investment, investment spending does not increase much on impact. As a
result the positive wealth eﬀect generated by the increase in productivity growth materializes
in an expansion of the consumption of leisure.
Figure 6 presents the Ramsey impulse responses to a one percent innovation in govern-
ment purchases. A one percent increase in government consumption raises output by 0.15
percent. Given that in the model the share of public consumption in GDP is assumed to
be 17 percent, it follows that the government spending multiplier implied by the model is
slightly below unity. The model predicts that the government should increase interest rates
in response to a positive government spending shock, which is in line with conventional
wisdom.
Figure 7 displays the model’s response to a one percentage point increase in the growth
rate of investment-speciﬁc technological change. Ramsey policy calls for an easing of money
market conditions in response to a positive investment-speciﬁc productivity shock. Again,
our intuition is that the Ramsey planner tries to mimic the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. In
the absence of price stickiness, real interest rates would fall. Hence, the Ramsey planner
40Figure 6: Ramsey Response To a Government Purchases Shock






















































Note: The size of the initial innovation to government purchases is one percent
of its steady state value, ln(¯ g0/¯ g) = 1%. The nominal interest rate and the
inﬂation rate are expressed in levels in percent at an annual rate. Output, wages,
investment,and consumption are expressed in cumulativegrowth rates in percent.
Hours and capacity utilization are expressed in percentage deviations from their
respective steady-state values.
41Figure 7: Ramsey Response To An Investment-Speciﬁc Productivity Shock

























































Note: The size of the initial innovation to the neutral technology shock is one
standard deviation, ln(µΥ,0/µΥ) = 1%. The nominal interest rate and the inﬂa-
tion rate are expressed in levels in percent per year. Output, wages, investment,
and consumption are expressed in cumulative growth rates in percent. Hours and
capacity utilization are expressed in percentage deviations from their respective
steady-state values.
42lowers nominal rates so as to achieve a fall in real rates without putting upward pressure on
inﬂation.
6 Optimal Operational Interest-Rate Rules
Ramsey outcomes are mute on the issue of what policy regimes can implement them. The
information on policy one can extract from the solution to the Ramsey problem is limited
to the equilibrium behavior of policy variables such as the nominal interest rate. But this
information is in general of little use for central banks seeking to implement the Ramsey equi-
librium. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium process of policy variables in the Ramsey equilibrium
is a function of all of the states of the Ramsey equilibrium. These state variables include all
of the exogenous driving forces and all of the endogenous predetermined variables. Among
this second set of variables are past values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints of the Ramsey problem. Even if the policymaker could observe the state of all of
these variables, using the equilibrium process of the policy variables to deﬁne a policy regime
would not guarantee the Ramsey outcome as the competitive equilibrium. The problem is
that such a policy regime could give rise to multiple equilibria.
In this section, we show that a simple interest-rate feedback rule implements the Ram-
sey equilibrium in the medium-scale model under study. Speciﬁcally, we focus on ﬁnding
parameterizations of interest-rate rules that satisfy the following 4 conditions: (a) They are
simple, in the sense that they involve only a few observable macroeconomic variables; (b)
They guarantee local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium; (c) The associated
path of the nominal interest rate does not violate the zero bound.7 and (d) They maximize
the expected lifetime utility of the representative household conditional on the initial state
of the economy being the deterministic steady state of the Ramsey economy. We refer to
rules that satisfy criteria (a)-(c) as operational. We refer to operational rules that satisfy
criterion (d) as optimal operational rules.
The family of rules that we consider consists of interest-rules whereby the nominal interest
rate depends linearly on its own lag, the rates of price and wage inﬂation, and the growth




























The target values R∗, π∗, πW ∗
and µ∗
y are assumed to be the Ramsey steady-state values
7We approximate this constraint by requiring that in the competitive equilibrium two standard deviations
of the nominal interest rate be less than the steady-state level of the nominal interest rate.
43of their associated endogenous variables. (The steady-state growth of output is indeed
exogenous and given by µz∗.) The variable πW
t denotes nominal wage inﬂation and in the
nonstochachstic steady state we have that πW ∗
≡ µz∗π∗. It follows that in our search for the
optimal operational policy rule, we pick the four policy parameters (απ,α W,α y,α R) so as to
maximize welfare, Vt ≡ E0
P∞
t=0 βtU(ct−bct−1,h t), where expectations are taken conditional
on the initial state being the non-stochastic steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. Given
the complexity of the model, an exact numerical solution does not exist. We therefore
approximate our conditional welfare measure to second-order accuracy using the numerical
method developed in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004c).
6.1 The Optimal Operational Rule




























The optimal operational interest-rate rule is active in both price and wage inﬂation because
both coeﬃcients are greater than unity. In addition, the rule prescribes virtually no response
to output growth. In this sense the optimized interest-rate rule can indeed be interpreted as a
pure inﬂation targeting rule. According to the above rule, the policymaker reacts positively
to lagged nominal interest rates. Because the interest-rate coeﬃcient is less than unity,
the rule is inertial but not superinertial. Thus, the policymaker is backward looking in its
response to inﬂation deviations from target.
To quantify the diﬀerence in the level of welfare under the Ramsey policy and under the
optimal operational rule, we compute the welfare costs of the optimal operational interest-
rate rules relative to the time-invariant equilibrium process associated with the Ramsey
policy.
We assume that at time zero all state variables of the economy equal their respective
Ramsey-steady-state values. Because the non-stochastic steady state is the same across all
policy regimes we consider, computing expected welfare conditional on the initial state being
the nonstochastic steady state ensures that the economy begins from the same initial point
under all possible polices.
Consider the Ramsey policy, and denote the contingent plans for consumption and hours
under the Ramsey policy by cr
t and hr
t. Similarly, denote the contingent plans under the
alternative policy regime by ca
t and ha
t. Let λc denote the welfare cost of adopting policy
regime a instead of the Ramsey policy conditional on a particular state in period zero. We
44Table 4: Welfare Under the Optimal Operational Rules
Parameterization απ αW αy αR (100 × λc) (100 × λu) c2006λc c2006λu
Optimized Rules [Eq. (48)]
Baseline Calibration 5.0 1.6 -0.1 0.4 0.001 0.001 $0.23 $0.19
High Wage Stickiness (˜ α =0 .9) 0.4 1.9 0.1 2.3 0.008 0.005 $2.50 $1.41
Ad-Hoc Rule
Taylor Rule – Output Level 1.5 0 0.5 0 0.14 0.16 $41.81 $48.06
Note. The variable c2006 ≡ $30,441 denotes nominal U.S. per capita personal
consumption expenditures seasonally adjusted at annual rates, in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2006. Source: www.bea.gov.
deﬁne λc as the fraction of regime r’s consumption process that a household would be willing
























Similarly, one can derive an unconditional welfare cost measure. That is one can ask which
fraction of consumption under the Ramsey policy are agents willing to give up, to attain
the same unconditional expectation of lifetime utility as under the alternative policy. Let λu





























We restrict attention to approximations of λc and λu that are accurate up to second order.
See the appendix for a derivation.
Table 4, displays the central result of this section. Namely, that the welfare costs of fol-
lowing the optimal operational interest rate rule rather than the Ramsey policy are virtually
zero; agents are willing to give up less than one one-hundreths of one percent of the Ramsey
consumption stream (or less than 23 cents per annum) to be as well oﬀ under the optimal
8Note that for analytical convenience we apply the factor (1 − λc)t oc−1 eventhough this variable is
predetermined at the time of the policy evaluation. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004d) we show that if one
were not to apply the factor (1 − λc)t oc−1, then one would obtain a welfare cost measure that is slightly
smaller than the one we obtain here. However, because the alternative welfare cost measure is proportioal
to the one we use here, the welfare rankings would be unchanged. Furthermore, our conclusion that the
opotimal operational rule yields virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey policy would only be
strengthened.
45operational rule as under the Ramsey policy.
A central characteristic of the optimal rule is that its response to output is mute. Forcing
the output coeﬃcient, αy, to be zero, increases the welfare cost by less than one cent per
year. This ﬁnding has an important policy implication. Central banks need not respond to
a measure of output in order to implement an equilibrium that provides virtually the same
level of welfare as the Ramsey policy.
While it is true that responding to output has virtually zero welfare gains, one can show
that it may have signiﬁcant welfare costs. In table 4 we consider a Taylor rule with a
coeﬃcient of 0.5 on deviations of output from trend (ln(Yt/Y)) and an inﬂation coeﬃcient
of 1.5. This rule is associated with welfare costs of almost $50 per person per year, or $ 200
per 4-person household per year.
Interest-rate smoothing is not essential from a welfare point of view in the present econ-
omy. Under the optimal rule the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient is 0.4. If one eliminates
interest-rate smoothing by setting αR = 0 while keeping the other rule coeﬃcients at απ =5 ,
αy = 0, and απW =1 .6, the welfare costs of the rule increase by 3 cents per year to 26 cents
per year, which we regard as negligible.9
Next, we address the question of how important it is for the central bank to respond to
both wage and price inﬂation rather than to just price inﬂation. Setting απW = αy = αR =0
and leaving απ at the optimized value of 5 increases welfre costs to 81 cents per year per
person (or 0.003 percent of annual consumption). This is still a fairly small number, which
leads us to conclude that a simple policy prescription, namely, responding aggressively to
price inﬂation only, can bring about an equilibrium in which agents are virtually as well oﬀ
as under the Ramsey policy. In this sense, we can interpret our ﬁndings as supportive of
inﬂation targeting policies.
Table 4 presents the optimal operational rule when wages are reoptimized every 10 quar-
ters, or ˜ α =0 .9. In the baseline calibration, we draw from the work of Altig et al. (2005)
and assume that wage contracts are reoptimized about every third quarter (˜ α =0 .69). As
mentioned earlier, the model of Altig et al. (2005) adopts the Erceg et al. (2000) model of
nominal wage stickiness. Under this formulation, wage dispersion generates heterogeneity in
work intensity across households. In our formulation, all households supply the same amount
of labor. In equilibrium, these two alternative modeling strategies result, up to ﬁrst order,
in a diﬀerent labor markup coeﬃcient in the wage Phillips curve. Speciﬁcally, under the
assumption of no growth, µυ = µz = 1, the log-linear approximation to the wage inﬂation
9In Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) we study a simpler model without nominal wage rigidity or growth.
In that model we also ﬁnd that the optimal interest-rate rule delivers virtually the same level of welfare as
the Ramsey policy, that the optimal response to output is nil, that responding to output can entail signiﬁcant
welfare costs, and that the welfare gains from interest-rate smoothing are negligible.
46Phillips curve in the Altig et al. model can be written as ˆ πW
t − ˆ πt−1 = β(Etˆ πW





˜ α . In our model, under the assumption of full wage indexation,
˜ χ = 1 (as maintained in Altig et al., 2005, as well as in our baseline calibration), the wage
Phillips-curve is given by ˆ πW
t − ˆ πt−1 = β(Etˆ πW
t+1 − ˆ πt) − (1 + ˜ η)γˆ ˜ µt. This means that the
coeﬃcient on the labor market markup is diﬀerent in the two models by a factor (1 + ˜ η).
Given the estimated value for γ reported by Altig et al. and given our baseline values for ˜ η
and β of 21 and 1.03−0.25, respectively, the implied value of ˜ α in the context of our model
is about 0.9. With this degree of wage stickiness the optimized interest-rate rule calls for a
more aggressive response to wage inﬂation and a less aggressive response to price inﬂation.
In addition, the optimal rule now displays a superinertial response to lagged interest rates.
The rule continues to call for a mute response to output variations. The welfare diﬀerences
between the optimal operation rule and the Ramsey policy are still small at 0.005 percent
of the Ramsey consumption stream.
In computing the coeﬀcients of the optimized policy rule, thus far we have restricted
attention to maximizing lifetime utility of the representative household conditional on a
particular initial the initial state of the economy being the nonstochastic Ramsey steady
state. Alternative, one could pick policy-rule coeﬃcients so as to maximize an unconditional
measure of lifetime utility. Our results are robust to adopting this alternative. Speciﬁcally,
under the unconditional welfare objective we obtain απ =5 .1, αW =1 .6, αy = −0.1,
αR =0 .4, 100 × λc =0 .001, and 100 × λu =0 .001.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 compare the impulse responses of all variables of the model to the
three shocks driving aggregate ﬂuctuations under the Ramsey-optimal policy (solid lines)
and under the optimized operational interest-rate rule (broken lines). In the ﬁgures, inﬂation
and the nominal interest rate are in percent per quarter deviations from their steady-state
values. All other variables are expressed in percent deviations from their deterministic steady
state. As described earlier in section 2.6 variables in capital letters are stationarity-inducing
transformations of the corresponding variables in lowercase letters. The ﬁgures suggest a
remarkable match between the Ramsey responses and the impulse responses associated with
the optimized operational interest-rate rule.
6.2 Interest-Rate Rules and Equilibrium Determinacy
For an interest-rate feedback rule to be operational, we require that it induce a locally
determinate rational expectations equilibrium. A natural question is what restrictions this
requirement imposes on the values that the parameters deﬁning the interest rate rule can
take. Figure 11 displays with dots the values of the price- and wage-inﬂation coeﬃcients
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50Figure 11: Interest-Rate Feedback Rules and Equilibrium Determinacy
















• Locally Determinate Equilibrium
Note: The policy parameters αy and αR are set to zero. All structural parameters
take their baseline values, given in table 1.
(απ and αW) in the interest-rate rule (48) for which the equilibrium is locally determinate.
In producing the ﬁgure, the remaining two policy parameters, αy and αR, associated with
output growth and the lagged interest rate are set to zero. It is clear from the ﬁgure that
to a ﬁrst approximation a condition for determinacy is that the sum of the price- and wage-
inﬂation coeﬃcients be greater than unity. That is, local determinacy of equilibrium requires
that
απ + αW > 1.
The result that the inﬂation coeﬃcient must be greater than unity for the equilibrium to be
unique is easily established in small models with few frictions (see, for example, Leeper, 1991).
It is of interest that the same principle applies to a much richer theoretical structure like the
one studied in the present paper. Also noteworthy is the apparent perfect substitutability on
the margin between the price- and wage-inﬂation coeﬃcients in ensuring local uniqueness.
In eﬀect, at the southwest frontier of the uniqueness area the price- and wage-inﬂation
coeﬃcients satisfy απ + αW ≈ 1.
Local uniqueness of equilibrium is related to the long-run values of the inﬂation coeﬃ-
cients of the interest-rate rule. In the example discussed thus far, the inertial term of the
policy rule, αR, is assumed to be nil. As a result, the short- and long-run values of the price-
and wage-inﬂation coeﬃcients coincide and are equals to απ and αW, respectively. Increasing
51the value of αR to its optimal level of 0.4 results in a local-determinacy area deﬁned by the
relation απ +αW > 0.4. This result appears to generalize to other values of the interest-rate
coeﬃcient. Thus, the pattern that appears to emerge implies roughly a determinacy area
deﬁned by the relation [απ + αW]/(1 − αR) > 1. In words, the long-run value of the price-
and wage-inﬂation coeﬃcients of the interest-rate rule must add up to a number larger than
unity for the equilibrium to be locally unique.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The central focus of the present study is the characterization and implementation of optimal
monetary policy in the context of a rich model of the macroeconomy with parameters and
sources of uncertainty estimated to ﬁt observed ﬂuctuations at business-cycle frequency.
The central recommendation that emerges from the solution of the Ramses optimization
problem is that the central bank should aim at a low and highly stable rate of inﬂation. This
prescription is very much in line with those proposed by advocates of inﬂation targeting.
At a deeper level, however, the inﬂation predictions of the Ramsey equilibrium are neither
robust nor coincidental with the inﬂation targeting principles. With respect to robustness,
the Ramsey-optimal inﬂation target varies enormously with the parameter determining the
degree of price stickiness. For empirically plausible values of this parameter, the optimal
inﬂation target ranges from the Friedman rule (i.e., minus the real interest rate) to price
stability. This apparent hypersensitivity of the optimal rate of inﬂation calls for an increased
eﬀort aimed at obtaining tighter estimates of the amount of nominal sluggishness present in
the economy.
An important diﬀerence between the predictions of the Ramsey equilibrium studied in
the present paper and the observed behavior of central banks adhering to inﬂation targeting
regimes is that the Ramsey optimal rate of inﬂation is negative (although possibly close to
zero) whereas inﬂation targeters around the world set targets for the inﬂation rate that are
signiﬁcantly above zero. We establish that in the context of the estimated medium-scale
model studied in this paper fear of confronting the zero-bound on nominal interest rates
can hardly represent an impediment to adopting the Ramsey-optimal rate of inﬂation. In
eﬀect, in the Ramsey equilibrium the nominal interest rate takes an average value of about
4.5 percent per year, with a standard deviation of about half a percent. It follows that
the chances that a shock would push the nominal interest rate to zero are negligible. This
result poses the challenge for future researchers of ﬁnding a theoretical explanation for the
optimality of positive inﬂation targets. Some have argued that the presence of downward
inﬂexibility in nominal prices and wages may provide a justiﬁcation for setting positive
52inﬂation targets. Formalizations of this idea have been limited to highly stylized models. It
remains to be seen whether medium-scale models incorporating a realistic degree of nominal
downward rigidities can generate optimal inﬂation targets similar in magnitude to those
observed across inﬂation targeting countries.
The issue of the interaction between optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in the context of
medium-scale models was touched upon in this paper but requires much further research. We
ﬁnd that the hypersensitivity of the optimal inﬂation target to the degree of price stickiness
alluded to above may disappear under certain ﬁscal arrangements. This is the case, for
instance, when ﬁscal policy is also set optimally and the ﬁscal authority has access only
to distortionary income taxes. But under alternative ﬁscal scenarios the hypersensitivity
problem may be exacerbated. This is the case, for instance, when the ﬁscal authority has
access to a combination of distortionary and nondistortionary taxes, but distortionary taxes
are ﬁxed (even if at the level prescribed by the Ramsey steady state) so that lump-sum taxes
are used on the margin to achieve intertemporal solvency.
In this paper we limit attention to an economy driven by three shocks that have been
shown to account for a sizable fraction of business cycles in the U.S. economy; namely, neutral
and investment-speciﬁc productivity shocks and government spending shocks. Ideally, the
study of optimal monetary policy would incorporate into the model all of the sources of
uncertainty that are important drivers of business cycles in the real world. The current
study is admittedly far from this theoretical desideratum. Progress in this area is in order.
There is no clear guideline on how to go about in this endeavor. We are skeptical of the
approach—recently adopted in some studies—of using the estimation residuals obtained from
econometric estimations of the DGE model as structural economic sources of uncertainty.
In many instances, these estimation errors are hardly interpretable as structural economic
shocks and are more likely a reﬂection of the fact that theory lags behind business cycles.
The dimension of the challenge that the presence of these ‘nonstructural’ errors pose for
macroeconomic theory is demonstrated by the fact that in most of the available estimates of
relatively large macroeconomic models, this class of shocks explain the majority of observed
business-cycle ﬂuctuations.
53Appendix: Deriving the Welfare Costs Measure
Consider the Ramsey policy, denoted by r, and an alternative policy regime, denoted by a.
We deﬁne the welfare associated with the time-invariant equilibrium implied by the Ramsey
















t denote the contingent plans for consumption and hours under the Ramsey
policy. Using the particular functional form for the period utility function given in equa-
tion (46) and setting φ3 to its baseline value of one, we can express the above expression in

























































































Let λc denote the welfare cost of adopting policy regime a instead of the Ramsey policy
conditional on a particular state in period zero. We deﬁne λc as the fraction of regime r’s
consumption process that a household would be willing to give up to be as well oﬀ under

























We restrict attention to an approximation of λc that is accurate up to second order. In
equilibrium, V a
0 and V r
0 are functions of the initial state vector x0 and the parameter σ￿
scaling the standard deviation of the exogenous shocks (see Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004c).
Therefore, we can write V a
0 = V ac(x0,σ ￿) and V r
0 = V rc(x0,σ ￿). This implies that λc must




Consider a second-order approximation of the function Λc around the point x0 = x and
σ￿ = 0, where x denotes the deterministic Ramsey steady state of the state vector. Because
we wish to characterize welfare conditional upon the initial state being the deterministic
Ramsey steady state, in performing the second-order expansion of Λc only its ﬁrst and












Because the deterministic steady-state level of welfare is the same across all monetary policies
belonging to the class deﬁned in equation (48), it follows that λc vanishes at the point
(x0,σ ￿)=( x,0). Formally,
Λ
c(x,0) = 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (49) with respect to σ￿, evaluating the result at (x0,σ ￿)=
(x,0), and using the result derived in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004c) that the ﬁrst
derivatives of the policy functions with respect to σ￿ evaluated at (x0,σ ￿)=( x,0) are nil
(V ac
σ￿ = V rc




Now totally diﬀerentiating (49) twice with respect to σ￿, and evaluating the result at
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